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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
PRODUCERS LIVESTOCK MARKETI~G 






CASE NO. 15388 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the trial court. 
"TR" refers to transcript of record and "EX" refers to exhibits. 
The findings of the trial court are set forth verbatim in the 
';1-PPendix. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, Producers Livestock Marketing Association, 
filed a two-count complaint against the defendant Zane Christen-
sen to recover $25,567.66, and $23,667.20 respectively, which 
represent sums paid on drafts drawn on plaintiff by defendant. 
In his Answer, defendant admitted receiving the respective sums 
but claimed a right of set-off and sought an accounting and 
-1-
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judgment against plaintiff on five business transactions upon 
which defendant counterclaimed. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court sitting without a jury, 
the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer presiding. At the conclusion 
of the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plai:· 
tiff on each count of the Complaint, and awarded judgment of 
$23,667.20, together with interest at the legal rate on Count: 
and the sum of $26,567.66, together with interest at the lega. 
rate on Count II. 
With respect to the Counterclaim of the defendant, the 
court denied recovery on all counts except as to Count V, upc~ 
which he granted judgment in favor of defendant for the sumo: 
$4,000.00, together with interest (TR 315-318). Thereafter, 
defendant filed objections to Findings of Fact, Conclusions c: 
Law and Judgment and Hotion to Amend same, and also filed a 
Motion for New Trial. After hearing, the court denied the 
Motion for New Trial and modified paragraph #5 of the Findin: 
of Fact. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks an affirmation of the judgment by the 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, Producers Livestock Marketing Association, is 
a Utah Co-operative Association engaged in buying and selling 
livestock for its members and other livestock producers. 
Defendant, Zane Christensen, resides in Talmadge, Utah, 
where he owns and operates a ranch maintaining 2,000 head of 
cattle. In addition to his own cattle operation, defendant is 
a registered and licensed livestock dealer buying and selling 
between 20,000 to 25,000 head of cattle per year (TR 26-28). 
In addition to its auction facilities, plaintiff main-
tains a country division with agents who, through direct contact 
with livestock producers in their local area, arrange for the 
purchase and sale of cattle (TR 122, 211). Since the mid-1950's, 
defendant has associated with plaintiff, through its country 
division, in purchasing cattle for plaintiff. This association 
has consisted primarily of a partnership relationship wherein 
defendant would purchase cattle from local ranchers, using 
plaintiff's draft book for the purchase price, and plaintiff 
would sell the cattle, with any profit or loss being allocated 
between the parties on an equitable basis taking into considera-
tion the source of the moneys used to purchase the cattle, the 
length of time required to complete the transaction, feed costs, 
freight charges and services rendered by each party (TR 122-124, 
-3-
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140-143). 
Plaintiff's two-count Complaint was brought to recover 
sums paid on outstanding drafts drawn by defendant for the 
purchase of cattle. In response, defendant filed a five-count 
Counterclaim demanding an accounting and judgment against 
plaintiff based upon the following separate and distinct trans· 
actions. 
Relating to Count I of defendant's Counterclaim, in 
September 1973, plaintiff, defendant and a third party not 
before the court, Waitt Cattle Company, partnered on the purch" 
of 2282 head of calves from the Ute Tribal Livestock Associatr 
located in Duchesne County, Utah. Defendant purchased the ca::1 
for the partnership, using plaintiff's draft book, for the s~l 
$611,605.38 (TR 52, 279) (EX I). After the cattle were purchd 
Waitt Cattle Company purchased 994 head reimbursing plaintiff 
$237,429. OS of the purchase price (TR 54, 279) (EX I). Of the 
remaining 1288 head, 86 were retained on defendant's ranch a~i 
1202 head were placed by defendant in a feed lot in Delta, Ut' 
operated by Max and Bert Johnson. Pursuant to an agreement be 
tween the defendant and the Johnsons when the cattle ••ere de-
livered to the feed lot, the Johnsons advanced the defendant 
$250.00 per head \vith an agreement that in the spring, defend: 
would buy the calves back for $250.00 per head and 42¢ per cc. 
-4-
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gain (TR 54-56, 61-62) (EX P). 
Upon receiving the advance from the Johnsons, defendant 
reimbursed plaintiff S283,500.00 of the purchase price (TR 56, 
279) (EX I). The balance of the purchase price in the amount 
of $90,676.33 was maintained on plaintiff's records as an 
accounts receivable until ~arch 31, 1974 at which time defen-
dant paid the account in full (TR 56, 65, 115-117, 155, 234, 
279-280) (EX I). 
In the spring when defendant was to buy back the calves 
from the Johnsons, because the market was so low, defendant 
renegotiated his agreement r,vi th the Johnsons which provided that 
of the 568 calves delivered to Bert Johnson, defendant would buy 
back 322 steers at a price of $102,900.00, plus pay Bert Johnson 
$11,946.18 on the feed bill of the heifers. Of the 634 calves 
delivered to Max Johnson, defendant agreed that Max Johnson would 
retain the calves and defendant would pay a negotiated feed bill 
of $75,000.00. Defendant paid the negotiated settlements out of 
his own personal funds and from a loan from an independent loan 
company (TR 57-58, 60-61) (EX 1, 2 and 4) . 1 
1 In his brief defendant claims that a portion of the payment 
made to Bert,Johnson was paid by drafts drawn on plaintiff. 
However, a review of the defendant's testimony and EX 3 indi-
cates that the payment was actually made thr?ugh a loan.fr?m 
an independent loan company not affiliated w~th the pla~nt~ff 
(TR 58-59) (EX 3). 
-5-
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The 322 calves re9urchased from the Johnsons and the 
86 head retained on defendant's ranch were ultimately sold to 
a cattle producer named Wheatheart Northwest in October 1974 
(EX N) . From the transaction, defendant suffered a net loss 
of $209,614.17 (TR 54-69, 159-161). 
Before the trial court, defendant contended that the 
parties were partners on the feed lot and buy-back agreement 
and therefore plaintiff should be responsible for one-half of 
the loss. Plaintiff contended, and the trial court found, th;· 
the defendant acted alone and not in partnership with the plat 
tiff at the time the calves were placed in the feed lot and 
therefore was responsible for the total amount of the loss. 
Relating to Count II of defendant's Counterclaim, in 
February 1974, defendant and plaintiff partnered in the purcha' 
of 772 head of cattle, which were purchased for $303,364.50. 
The cattle were subsequently sold for $314,747.64 netting t~ 
partnership a profit of $11,383.14. Plaintiff's agent, af~r 
calculating the costs, charges, services rendered, losses sus· 
tained and the length of time required to collect moneys, 
divided the profit with defendant receiving $4,600.00 and 
plaintiff receiving $6,783.14 (TR 161-162, 263-267). Defe~r 
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As to Count III of defendant's counterclaim, in March, 
1974 plaintiff and defendant partnered in the purchase of 
254 head of cattle, which were purchased for $62,795.40. The 
cattle were subsequently sold for $67,696.32 netting the 
partnership a profit of $4,900.92. Plaintiff's agent, after 
calculating the costs, charges, services rendered, losses sus-
tained and the length of time required to collect moneys, 
divided the profits with defendant receiving $2,000.00 and 
plaintiff receiving $2,900.00 (TR 161-162, 261-272). Defendant 
contended below that he was entitled to an equal distribution 
of the profits. 
Relating to Count IV in 1970, the parties partnered on 
the purchase of 1353 head of cattle which were purchased for 
$185,711.20. The cattle were subsequently sold for $188,565.38 
netting the partnership a profit of $5,404.18. Plaintiff's 
agent, after calculating the costs, charges, services rendered, 
losses sustained and the length of time required to collect 
moneys, divided the profit with defendant receiving $2,550.00 
and plaintiff receiving $2,854.18 (TR 259-262). Defendant con-
tended below that he was entitled to an equal distribution of 
the profits. 
Relating to Count V, during the fall of 1970 defendant 
agreed to feed 80 head of cattle for plaintiff. Defendant 
-7-
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placed the cattle on a ranch in Duschesne County, Utah and ho: 
the cattle fed until spring 1971. Defendant paid the feed cc 
in the sum of $4,000.00. Defendant claims that pursuant to:· 
feeding agreement, plaintiff is obligated to pay the feed cos: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT BE 
DISTURBED BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIAL 
COURT CLEARLY PREPONDERATES IN FAVOR OF THE FINDINGS. 
In reviewing the instant case, defendant acknowledges 
that the trial court 1 s findings will not be disturbed if fo11': 
upon sufficient evidence. In elaborating on the review proce' 
in an equity case, this court has recognized that the tr~l 
court 1 s findings are presumed correct and that the reviewing 
court will not upset the findings unless the evidence clear!,· 
preponderates against those findings. Del Porto v. Nichols, 
27 Ut. 2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972); Nokes v. Continental Min:· 
& Millin9: Co., 6 Ut. 2d 177, 308 P. 2d 954 ( 1957); Coombs v. 
Ouzounian, 24 Ut. 2d 39, 465 P. 2d 357 (1970). 
the 
The justification for this rule was clearly defined :· 
Nokes case wherein this court stated: 
" ... credit should be indulged in favor of the findinc, 
of the trial court because of the advantages peculW 
to his position in immediate contract with the trial. 
It is indeed often true that, "the manner hath more 
-8-
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eloquence than naked words oortend." There are 
intangibles of expression and attitude which give 
color and meaning not apparent from words alone. 
The trial judge feels the impact of the person-
alities of the parties and the witnesses: He is 
able to observe their appearance and behavior; 
their forthrightness or hesitancy in answering; 
their frankness and candor, or lack of it. Simi-
larly revealing to him are indications of surprise, 
anger, resentment or vindictiveness, pleasure or 
other emotions which may be discerned from expres-
sions of the countenance or voice. He also has 
some advantage in appraising their abilities to 
understand and their capacities to remember. 
Furthermore, he is in a position to question the 
witness himself to clarify doubtful points or 
verify his impressions on the matters just mentioned. 
All of this combines to afford him better insight as 
to the truthfulness of the testimony offered than 
does a perusal of the cold record. It is a sound 
and well recognized policy of the law to repose 
some confidence in the verity of the actions of 
the trial court, and not to interfere with them 
unless it clearly appears that he is in error." 
(Footnote omitted) Id. at 6 Ut.2d at 178, 308 P.2d 
at 955. 
Thus, in order for the defendant to prevail on appeal, 
the evidence must clearly show that the trial court's findings 
are arbitrary and capricious because they are not based upon 
sufficient evidence. 
Defendant contends that the only probative and credible 
evidence before the trial court were his own self-serving state-
ments and those of a witness, J. L. Lindsay, a terminated employ-
ee of the plaintiff. However, a review of the evidence before 
the court shows sufficient and preponderating evidence to support 
-9-
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each finding and raises serious questions as to the credibil. 
of Lindsay's testimony. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING LINDSAY 
TO BE ADVERSE TO PLAINTIFF BECAUSE THERE WAS 
EVIDENCE OF INTEREST AND BIAS IN FAVOR OF 
DEFENDANT. 
Because defendant's appeal relies so heavily on Linds; 
testimony, plaintiff addresses defendant's second point of ar 
ment preliminarily. 
One of the witnesses called by defendant was Lindsay, 
former employee who worked for plaintiff approximately 27 ye" 
and who was terminated for cause in the summer of 1975 (TR L 
122, 220-222). l'lhen defendant called Lindsay, defendant mov' 
that Lindsay be declared an adverse witness. The trial cour: 
denied the motion and further found Lindsay to be adverse tc 
plaintiff. 2 (TR 120-121) . Defendant challenges that findin: 
contending there is no evidence in the record indicating tl[ 
Lindsay was either biased or interested in the outcome. 
Testimony before the court revealed that Lindsay was: 
manager of plaintiff's country division and the agent who be: 
solicited defendant's association with plaintiff and wast~ 
exclusive agent representing plaintiff in the numerous tran;· 
actions with defendant (TR 39-41, 121-125, 211, 225-227). ~ 
2 See Appendix, Finding 6. 
-10-
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record also reveals an ongoing business relationship between 
the defendant and Lindsay since Lindsay left plaintiff's em-
ployment. 
Defendant admitted that for at least a two-year period 
prior to trial he had been selling cattle to the Peter Waitt 
Cattle Company, the same company for which Lindsay had been 
acting as an agent (TR 28, 103-104, 138, 168). Lindsay also 
testified that since being terminated from plaintiff's employ-
ment, he has personally continued to purchase cattle from the 
defendant (TR 167-168). Thus, not only is there a question of 
bias against the plaintiff because of his termination, there is 
also sufficient evidence in the record to show an interest on 
Lindsay's part due to his continuing business relations with 
defendant. This evidence not only supports the trial court's 
findings, but also raises serious question as to the credibility 
and probative value of Lindsay's testimony. It is also important 
to note that on critical points of defendant's case, the testi-
mony given by Lindsay was seriously impeached (TR 169, 170, 202-
209, 214-218). 
B. THE TRIAL COU~T'S FINDINGS ARE BASED UPON 
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AS WELL AS OTHER ORAL 
TESTIMONY SUFFICIENT TO BE SUPPORTED ON 
APPEAL. 
Contrary to defendant's contention that the only probative 
evidence is the testimony of himself and Lindsay, the trial court 
-11-
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also had before it documentary evidence in the form of "dea: 
sheets" prepared by plaintiff which, in essence, were sununary 
sheets prepared for each cattle transaction. As explainedb 
plaintiff's accountant, when cattle were purchased, plaint~~ 
prepared a deal sheet which showed on the top of the sheet~ 
party from whom the cattle were purchased; the number, kind, 
weights of the cattle; and the price paid for the cattle. !' 
bottom of the sheet showed the sale of the specific cattle, :. 
eluding the name of the purchaser, the number of head purcha;. 
and the purchase price (TR 18-20). Also reflected on the de; 
sheet were the feed, freight and servicing charges incurred. 
the purchase and sale, as well as any partnership profit or. 
division. 
Defendant dismisses this documentary evidence as "se:' 
serving" and "lacking in proper foundation". However, it is 
important to note that the deal sheets were prepared contemP 
with the specific transactions in question and generally uni, 
supervision of Lindsay (TR 16-20, 139-140, 168-169). 
It is also interesting that defendant on many occasL 
provided the information contained on the deal sheets and a:' 
trial testified the information contained in the deal shee:'' 
reliable. Defendant's own accountant testified that he re·:.: 
the deal sheets, used them in compiling defendant's exhihl~ 
-12-
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concurred in their accuracy (TR 53-54, 107-109, 177-194). Also 
on this point, defendant admitted he had his own books and rec-
ords, but none were introduced to rebut plaintiff's deal sheets 
(TR 108, 177-194). Thus, the deal sheets stand as unrefuted 
evidence in determining the nature of the parties' agreements 
and the actions of the parties at the time the specific trans-
actions were in process. 
Perhaps even more important than the documentary evidence 
are the actions of both the defendant and Lindsay at the time 
each transaction was in process because those actions conflict 
with their own testimony on several critical points as herein-
after indicated. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS RELATING TO THE NATURE 
OF THE PARTNERSHIP RELATIONSHIP, THE ACCOUNTING 
AND THE DIVISION OF PROFITS AND LOSSES ABE SUB-
STA~TIATED BY PREPONDERATING EVIDENCE AND THERE-
FORE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Germane to all of defendant's counterclaims (except V, 
not at issue on appeal) is a fact determination relating to the 
. 3 I nature of the business relationship between the part1es. n 
Findings #5, 6 and 7, the court found that the parties were 
engaged in a partnership and that when a transaction was completed 
3 See Appendix, Finding 5, 6 and 7. 
-13-
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an accounting would be made between the parties and the prot;.' 
or losses would be divided on an equitable basis after con~~ 
ing factors such as the time, services and money provided by 
4 
each party. 
Neither plaintiff nor defendant challenge the findi~ 
partnership. However, defendant challenges that portion of 
Finding #7 relating to whether actual accountings had occurre: 
and the reasonableness of the allocation of profits. Defendt' 
apparently contends that even though accountings were discus" 
they were frequently postponed or ignored. A more accurate 
representation of the testimony would be that in each instanco 
complained of by defendant, an accounting actually occurred b. 
that defendant disagreed with the amount of profit allocated· 
him ( TR 7 4, 7 7, 81- 8 2, 8 4) . 
In understanding the nature of the partnership and the 
distribution of profits and losses, both defendant and Lindsa: 
testified that plaintiff settled the transactions, as reflec:· 
on the deal sheets, and that Lindsay had the sole discretioo 
4 Defendant challenges that portion of Finding #5 indicati~: 
that defendant purchased livestock from plaintiff, cla1m:: 
there is no testimony or evidence to support the findlM, 
However before the court were three deal sheets which soecifi~ally show that defendant did in fact purchase ca:: 
from the plaintiff (TR 265, 269-270, 272, 281;. 
-14-
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allocating profits and losses between the parties. (TR 71, 
92-95, 100, 126, 142-143). As to how the percentage of profit 
was allocated to the respective parties, the testimony is in 
conflict. Defendant testified that items such as freight, fuel 
costs, handling charges and interest were deducted before 
dividing the profits on a 50/50 basis (TR 100). However, Lindsay 
testified that all of these factors, including whose money was 
used to acquire the cattle and how long the money was tied up 
before collection, entered into his decision on whether or how 
much profit or loss would be allocated to the defendant, and the 
profit was not always divided evenly (TR 94, 100, 126, 142-143, 
161-165). Thus, with the testimony in conflict it is obvious 
that the trial court chose to accept Lindsay's version on profit 
allocations. It is significant that the deal sheets corresponding 
to each transaction in question, except for Count I of the Counter-
claim, supports Lindsay's testimony (EX C, E, F, G, H, Q and 9). 
Therefore, the findings on allocation of profits are supported 
by substantial evidence and should not be altered on appeal. 
POINT III 
THE FINDINGS UPON WHICH THE TRIAL COURT DENIED 
RECOVERY ON COUNTS I, II, III AND IV OF DEFEN-
DANT'S COUNTERCLAIM ARE SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE IN 
THE RECORD AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
A. COUNT I: THE 1973 UTE INDIAN CATTLE TRANSACTION. 
Findings #8, 9 and 10 relate to Count I of defendant's 
-15-
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Counterclaim involving the purchase of calves from the Ute 
Tribal Livestock Association in 1973. 5 
Of the many cattle transactions upon which plaintiff , 
and defendant jointly participated, at least one transaction 
would occur yearly in the fall. That transaction was the p~:· 
chase of calves from the Ute Tribal Livestock Association lq 
in Duchesne County, Utah. Because of the repetitive nature· 
those yearly purchases, plaintiff introduced deal sheets rela:. 
to the 1971, 1972 and 1975 purchases to shmv the significan:l 
ferences between those transactions and the 197 3 transactior .. 
Finding #8 is merely a summary of the facts before the court 
relating to the 1971, 1972 and 1975 transactions. The cour:' 
found the parties partnered on those purchases and that ther, 
had been partnership accountings and profit allocations. 
Defendant makes a broad and vague assertion that Fine. 
#8 is inconsistent with overwhelming evidence; however, noc 
trary evidence is cited to refute the finding. In support1: 
Finding #8, the following testimony from Lindsay is signif;: 
Q. And prior to that time, had there been some de a:: 
made by you and Mr. Christensen with the Ute Cattle and Li'.'' 
Company? 
5 See ~ppendix Findings 8, 9 and 10. 
-16-
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A. Oh, yes, many times. 
Q. And what was your participation in those deals? 
A. Well, we more or less just shared the profits and 
things and if there was more than one participant, then they 
shared with us (TR 125). 
Specifically relating to the splitting of profits on the 
1971 and 1972 deals, Lindsay further testified as follows: 
Q. Did most of these transactions, or all of the trans-
actions that took place prior to this Ute Indian deal, what was 
the nature of the division of profits that you would make or 
how would you treat the profits from the sale of the cattle? 
A. Well, as close as possible, we tried to stay fairly 
equally. It depends on the expenses of each of us. Sometimes, 
I had very little expense, and sometimes I had to fly some 
people in there or do something or another. But the division 
was as close to the middle as we could. 
Q. And was that the understanding that you had in the 
participating in these respective Indian deals? 
A. Yes (TR 126). 
Doc~mentary evidence concerning the 1971, 1972 and 1975 
Ute Tribal Livestock Association transactions also confirms 
Finding ~8. Relating to the 1971 transaction, plaintiff's 
accou~tant testified that there apparently was a partnership 
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split between plaintiff and defendant, with defendant receil': 
$14,084.00 and plaintiff receiving $16,061.18 (TR 272-274). 
With respect to the 1972 transaction, the deal sheet reflecto 
that there was a three-way partnership split, with the defenc. 
receiving $2,871.76, plaintiff $3,798.39 and a third party 
$2,696.76 (TR 274-278). Similarly, the 1975 deal sheet ref~ 
a partnership split with defendant receiving $3,567.00 and 
plaintiff receiving $4,023.15 (TR 278-279). The various e~ 
hibits show that defendant did in fact use plaintiff's dnfu 
for the purchases, and testimony from both the defendant and 
Lindsay support the other elements of the partnership trans· 
action contained in the finding (TR 274-279). 
Defendant challenges three specific elements of F~~ 
#9 relating to (1) the price paid for the cattle, (2) the~ 
fendant' s contracting for the feeding of the calves, and (31 
the reimbursement by defendant of the $90,676.33. 
Relating to the purchase price, defendant claims tha: 
the evidence does not support the fact that the calves were 
purchased in excess of the agreed upon bid price. Contra0 
defendant's claim, the record shows the parties actually co· 
ferred concerning the price range within which the calves ~ 
to be purchased and that the actual price was far in exceso 
that range. Significantly, at trial defendant denied that 
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there had been any instructions concerning price, but that he 
was merely to use his own judgment (TR 51, 52, 105). Conflict-
ing with that testimony is the following testimony by Lindsay: 
Q. Now, with respect to the Ute Cattle deal of 1973, 
did you have a conversation with Mr. Christensen prior to the 
time with respect to how much money you should pay for the 
cattle. 
* * * 
A. Yes, we did discuss it. 
Q. What was the nature of your conversation? 
A. I told him about what I thought we should do and that 
Mr. Short would be there and he would just have to play it by ear. 
* * * 
Q. Did you set an exact amount? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you set a range. 
A. Yes, we did set a range (TR 143-144). 
Later Lindsay testified that they anticipated that the 
cattle would be purchased for approximately 85¢ per pound (TR 148). 
In actuality, the cattle were purchased for 96¢ per pound at the 
same time the average market price for similar cattle was just 
over 70¢ per pound (TR 146-148). Testifying on his reaction upon 
learning the inflated purchase price, Lindsay stated that he 
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"about dropped dead" (TR 127). The court should also note t-. 
the point of an actual purchase price limit was the subj~t~ 
ter of impeaching testimony affecting the credibility of Lir.c. 
testimony (TR 205). Thus, there was sufficient evidence be::: 
the trial court to justify the finding that defendant purc~a: 
the calves at a price exceeding the price agreed upon betwee: 
the parties. 
Defendant 1 s remaining challenges of Finding #9 are ir.e 
tricably related to his challenge of Finding #10 because ~e 
relate specifically to his theory for recovery under Count I 
of his Counterclaim. In Finding 110, the trial court in esm 
found that on the 1973 Ute Indian transaction, the parties~ 
partners only for the purchase of the calves, and that there'' 
the partnership ended and the defendant acted alone in pl~~ 
the calves in the feed lot. Defendant contended both at the 
trial court and now on appeal that after the cattle were pur· 
chased, it was a joint decision between the parties to place J 
calves in a feed lot during the falling market. He also a~' 
that the joint venture continued until the calves were ult~ 
ly sold at a substantial loss and that plaintiff should par:. 
pate in that loss. Conversely, plaintiff 1 s position is tha: 
defendant acted alone in placing the cattle in the feed lot· 
therefore are not participants in the loss. 
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Factually, three parties participated in the purchase 
of the calves. These parties consisted of plaintiff, defendant, 
and Waitt Cattle Company. Defendant was at the sale and pur-
chased the calves for the parties at a price far in excess of 
the agreed upon price. Defendant drafted on plaintiff for the 
full purchase price of $611,605.38. After the purchase, the deal 
sheet shows that Waitt Cattle Company purchased 994 head reim-
bursing plaintiff $237,429.05 of the purchase price (TR 53-54). 
From this point, even though both defendant and Lindsay 
testified they acted in concert, the facts show both acted as 
if the remaining cattle were sold to defendant. So successful 
was defendant in acting alone, that plaintiff's management was 
unaware defendant claimed it had an interest in the calves until 
eighteen months after the calves were placed in a feedlot. 
Concerning defendant's actions, testimony from Bert 
Johnson revealed that in prior years the defendant had placed 
his own cattle in the Delta feed lot on a price per pound gain 
basis (TR 238-299). However, in 1973 defendant negotiated a new 
feeding arrangement calling for the Johnsons to advance $250.00 
per head upon delivery to the feed lot, together with a price 
per pound gain basis (TR 242-243). When the cattle were deliver-
ed, Max Johnson received 634 head advancing the sum of $158,500.00 
and Bert Johnson received 500 head advancing $125,000.00 to 
defendant (TR 55-56). Significantly, defendant in turn endorsed 
the advances over to plaintiff which were credited against the 
outstanding purchase price and shown as a sale to defendant (EX I)· 
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After the advances were credited, the deal sheet reflects ~ 
there \lias still outstanding the sum of $90,676.33 (TR 56). 
Significantly, on March 31, 1974, defendant paid the outstan: 
ing balance in full from his own personal funds (TR 56-57, 2: 
235) (EX I). If plaintiff remained a partner in the feed lo: 
operation, defendant's actions in getting the account receiq 
paid off are inexplainable. 
It is also significant that at no time did plaintiHJ 
an agent or employee participate in the negotiations with e.' 
Johnsons. Testimony from Bert Johnson revealed that neither 
at the time the Johnsons visited defendant's ranch to negott 
the feeding agreement, nor the time the cattle were delivere:l 
the feed lot was plaintiff represented. All negotiations we: 
with the defendant alone, and in fact, the written agreernen:' 
entered into solely with defendant (TR 157, 250-253) (EX Pl. 
Even more contradictory to his own theory are defenc' 
actions at the time the calves were removed from the feed 1: 
In June 1974, when the time came for the calves to be remove 
from the feed lot, the market still was at a very low mark. 
Therefore, rather than take all the cattle back, defendant: 
negotiated the agreement with the Johnsons. The result was 
of the 500 calves delivered to Bert Johnson, defendant ~~ 
back 322 steers for $102,900.00 and also paid a feed bill' 
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the heifers retained by Johnsons of $11,946.98. Of the 634 
calves delivered to Hax Johnson, defendant and Johnson agreed 
that Johnson would keep the calves and defendant would pay the 
feed bill of $75,000.00 (TR 57-58, 60-61). If plaintiff were 
still a partner, it would be a simple matter for the defendant 
to draft on plaintiff for the amounts owed to the Johnsons be-
cause he still had possession of a draft book (TR 28-30) . How-
ever, instead of drafting on plaintiff, which •¥ould have brought 
the calves back on plaintiff's book as inventory, defendant made 
payment to the Johnsons directly from his own personal funds and 
a personal loan from an independent loan company (TR 55-59) 
(EX 3). 
The remaining cattle repurchased by defendant from the 
Johnsons and returned to his ranch were sold approximately four 
to five months later to another cattle producer named Wheatheart. 
The deal sheet on this subsequent transaction shows that the 
cattle were owned by defendant and sold to Wheatheart with de-
fendant receiving all the proceeds except for a dealer sales 
commission paid to the plaintiff (TR 63-65, 161). Thus, even 
at the point the remaining cattle were ultimately sold, there was 
no evidence or record that olaintiff had a partnership interest 
in the cattle. 
One has to question the reliability of Lindsay's testimony 
-23-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that the plaintiff was a partner in the feed lot agreement 
when he prepared the deal sheets showing a "cleaned-up trans-
action" instead of a "deal in progress" or "cattle in inventc: 
particularly in light of a regulation of the plaintiff whi~ 
precludes feed lot operations without prior approval which 
Lindsay testified he did not have (TR 148-155, 211-214). Pe:·l 
the most incredible aspect of Lindsay's testimony relates~: 
alleged buy-back agreement with defendant because when exarnL 
Lindsay concerning the sale of the remaining cattle to Wheat:.'' 
Lindsay could not identify the cattle and merely indicated t: 
it was a sale of cattle owned by defendant and sold to Wheat:., 
with plaintiff retaining a sales commission only (TR 159-161 
(EX N) . Thus, Lindsay was totally unaware of the dispositk 
the cattle he allegedly was partnering on. 
In summary of the evidence relating to Finding #10, t: 
only evidence supporting a theory of partnership are the cor.:~ 
dieted testimony of the defendant and Lindsay, neither of wh.: 
are consistent with their 01"'n actions or the documentary evL 
and testimony before the trial court. By contrast, the fi~' 
are supported by the testimony of an independent third part;· 
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B. COUNTS II, III AND IV. 
Defendant merely makes a general assertion that the 
remaining findings are fraught with similar errors. No attempt 
is made to document or substantiate from the record any of the 
alleged errors. In doing so, only a general response seems 
appropriate. 
On each of the transactions referred to in Counts II, 
III and IV, the trial court received the corresponding deal 
sheet which reflected that defendant did receive an equitable 
partnership distribution. Significantly, also, Lindsay testi-
fied that on these transactions defendant received a fair dis-
tribution after considering the participation of each party 
(TR 135-137, 161-164, 165). 
CONCLUSION 
On appeal, the only evidence the defendant presents to 
challenge the trial court findings is the defendant's own self-
serving testimony and that of J. L. Lindsay, a biased former 
employee of the plaintiff. By contrast, the more reliable and 
?reponderating evidence upon which the trial court's findings 
'.vere based consists of documentary evidence and the testimony of 
an independent third party which clearly show a contradiction 
between the defendant's action and testimony. Viewing that 
evidence in its totality and recognizing the deference accorded 
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to the trial court's decision based upon its unique positiot 
judge the veracity of the evidence as it is presented, the!:. 
court's decision should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BEN E. RAWLINGS and 
JAMES R. MORGAN of 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS, WEST & SCH.q 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1300 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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APPENDIX 
BEN E. RAWLINGS 
JAMES R. MORGAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1300 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 359-2093 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PRODUCERS LIVESTOCK MARKETING 






FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 21270 
This case came on regularly for hearing on the 25th 
day of April, 1977, before the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, 
one of the judges of the above entitled court, sitting without 
a jury, and plaintiff, Producers Livestock Marketing Association, 
appearing through Joseph I. Jacob, executive secretary and 
by counsel Ben E. Rawlings and James R. Morgan, and defendant, 
Zane Christensen, appearing personally and by his counsel, 
R. Earl Dillman and Brant H. Wall, and before the court were 
the claims of the plaintiff and the counterclaims of the 
defendant to be tried, 
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Whereupon, witnesses were sworn and evidence presentee 
both oral and written in support of the allegations of the 
complaint and counterclaim, and the court having heard the 
evidence so adduced by the plaintiff and defendant, and being 
fully advised in the premises, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the plaintiff, Producers Livestock 
Marketing Association, is and at all times herein mentioned 
was a Utah co-operative association engaged in the buying and 
selling of livestock for its members and other producers. 
2. That the defendant, Zane Christensen is and 
at all times herein mentioned was an owner of livestock as 
well as a licensed livestock dealer engaged in buying, owning, 
feeding, and selling of livestock. 
3. That with respect to Count I of plaintiff's 
complaint, the defendant drew a draft on plaintiff in the sure 
$23,667.20 for the alleged purchase of cattle, which draft 
was honored by the plaintiff and for which the plaintiff has 
not been reimbursed. 
4. That with respect to Count II of plaintiff's 
complaint, on or about June 13, 1975, the defendant drew 
a draft on plaintiff in the sum of $26,567.66 for the allegec 
purchase of cattle, which draft was honored ~y the plaintiE 
and for which the plaintiff has not been reimbursed. 
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5. That over the course of many years, the parties 
hereto have engaged in several types of business relations 
with each other. That initially, the defendant sold livestock 
to and purchased livestock from the plaintiff. That for many 
years, the business relationship between the parties has included 
feeding and partnership transactions. 
6. That the partnership agreement between the 
parties while varying with each transaction, consisted 
primarily of the following types: 
(a) The purchase of livestock from various 
sellers by the defendant, and the subsequent sale of livestock 
by plaintiff. 
(b) The purchase of livestock by the plaintiff 
and the subsequent sale of said livestock by the defendant. 
{c) The purchase and sale of livestock by the 
plaintiff with the defendant providing services and handling. 
That in formulating and implementing each type of partnership 
transaction, the defendant acted personally and the plaintiff 
acted through J. L. Lindsay, who was plaintiff's agent until 
his employment was terminated in July, 1975. That the 
said J. L. Lindsay testifying in behalf of defendant was 
adverse to the plaintiff in the instant action. 
7. That with respect to each of the foregoing 
partnership transactions, when a partnership deal was completed, 
the defendant personally and the plaintiff through its then 
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agent and employee, J. L. Lindsay, would have a partnership 
accounting. By the terms of the oral partnership agreement, 
if a profit or loss was realized on the transaction, plainti:' 
agent, J. L. Lindsay, and defendant would then determine 
the percentage of profit and loss to be allocated to each 
party, based upon several factors including the time and 
services provided by each party, the money contributed by 
each party, the time required to complete the transaction, ar.: 
the time required to have the money repaid. 
8. That with respect to Count I of Defendant's 
Counterclaim, during the fall of the years 1971, 1972, and 
1973, and the spring of 1975, plaintiff and defendant partner, 
on the purchase of cattle from the Ute Tribal Livestock Assoc. 
tion. That the partnership transaction for the years 1971,: 
and 1975 consisted of the defendant personally and the plain: 
through its agent, J. L. Lindsay, agreeing on the price tote 
bid for the cattle, defendant purchasing the cattle using 
plaintiff's draft to pay for the cattle, plaintiff receiri~ 
the cattle, and plaintiff and defendant working together to' 
the cattle. That on each yearly transaction after the catt;, 
were sold, the defendant personally, and the plaintiff th~~ 
its agent, J. L. Lindsay had a partnership accounting when: 
the profits realized on the respective transactions were 
split approximately equally betwee~ the parties. 
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9. That with respect to the 1973 purchase of cattle 
from the Ute Tribal Livestock Association, the plaintiff 
and defendant together with Waitt Cattle Company partnered 
on the purchase of 2,282 head of cattle. That while the defendant 
personally and plaintiff's agent, J. L. Lindsay agreed on the 
price to be bid for the cattle, at the time the cattle were 
purchased, the defendant bid in excess of the agreed upon bid 
price. That the cattle were purchased for the sum of $611,605.38 
which sum was paid by the plaintiff. That after the cattle 
were purchased by the defendant, Waitt Cattle Company took 994 
head of cattle, reimbursing the plaintiff $237,429.05 of the 
purchase price. That of the 1288 head remaining, the defendant 
personally contracted with Max and Bert Johnson of Delta, Utah 
to feed 1202 head. That for the cattle which were delivered to the 
Johnsons, the plaintiff was reimbursed $283,500.00 in the form 
of two checks written by the Johnsons to the defendant which 
were subsequently endorsed by the defendant over to the plaintiff. 
That the remaining 86 head of cattle were kept on the defendant's 
ranch in Duchesne, Utah. That the remaining $90,676.33 of the 
purchase price for the cattle remained on plaintiff's books 
and records as an accounts receivable until March 30, 1974, 
at which time, defendant reimbursed plaintiff said amount in full. 
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10. That a partnership existed between the plaintiff 
and the defendant on the purchase of the Ute Indian cattle in 
197 3. That said partnership was terminated when the rernainin: 
cattle rather than being sold as in prior years were placed 
by the defendant on his ranch in Duchesne, Utah, and in the 
Johnson Feed Yards in Delta, Utah. That a final partnership 
accounting was made as of March 30, 1974 when the defendant pi. 
the plaintiff the sum of $90,676.33, which was the amount out:: 
ing on the original purchase price. That at the time defenda:.· 
made said payment, the partnership between the parties was 
terminated and any subsequent transactions relating to the sun 
cattle were carried on by the defendant without knowledge 
or consent of the plaintiff. 
11. That with respect to Count II of Defendant's 
Counterclaim in the spring of 1974 plaintiff and defendant 
partnered on a transaction wherein 772 head of cattle were 
purchased from Dearden Brothers. That the cattle were sold 
to various cattle purchasers. That the cattle were purchased 
for $303,364.50 and were subsequently sold for $314,747.64, ~' 
the partnership a profit of $11,383.14. That the defendant 
personally and the plaintiff through his agent, J. L. Linds~ 
had a partnership accounting on this transaction wherein the 
prcfit was split, and the defendant received $4,600.00 cash. 
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The plaintiff, after deduction of loss realized from sale of part 
of the subject cattle, received $6,783.14. 
12. That with respect to Count III of Defendant's 
Counterclaim, in the fall of 1973, plaintiff and defendant 
partnered on a transaction wherein 254 head of cattle were 
purchased from Reed Robinson and subsequently sold to Meagher 
Company. That the cattle were purchased for $62,795.40 and 
subsequently sold for $67,696.32, netting the partnership 
a profit of $4,900.92. That the defendant personally and the 
plaintiff through its agent, J. L. Lindsay, had a partnership 
accounting wherein the profit was split and the defendant 
received $2,000.00, and the plaintiff received $2,900.92. 
13. That with respect to Count IV of Defendant's 
Counterclaim in the year 1970, plaintiff and defendant 
partnered on a transaction wherein cattle were purchased 
from various cattle producers and sold to McKinley and 
Unruh in Nevada. That after the cattle were sold, the 
partnership realized a net profit of $5,300.00. That the defend-
ant personally, and the plaintiff through its agent J. L. 
Lindsay, had a partnership accounting wherein the defendant 
received $2,500.00 and the plaintiff received $2,800.00. 
14. That with respect to Count V of Defendant's 
Counterclaim, the defendant agreed to feed certain cattle 
for plaintiff during the fall of 1970. That pursuant to 
-7a-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
said agreement, the plaintiff through its agent, J. L. Lin~~ 
delivered 80 head of cattle to the defendant. That the 
defendant placed the cattle on the ranch of Joe Wilkins in 
Duchesne County, Utah. In the spring of 1971, the defendaM 
paid said Wilkins $4,000.00 for the feeding of said cattle, 
and defendant delivered said cattle back to the plaintiff. 
That the defendant has made requests of the plaintiff for 
payment of the $4,000.00, which remains unpaid. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
makes the following Conclusions of Law: 
1. That the plaintiff, Producers Livestock 
Marketing Association is entitled to a judgment against the 
defendant in the sum of $23,667.20, plus interest at the lega: 
rate from May 21, 1975 on the draft drawn on plaintiff by 
defendant on or about May 17, 1975. 
2. That the plaintiff, Producers Livestock 
Marketing Association is entitled to a judgment against the 
defendant in the sum of $26,567.66, plus interest at the lega 
rate from June 23, 1975 on the draft drawn on the plaintiff 
by defendant on or about June 13, 1975. 
3. That on Count I of Defendant's Counterclaim, 
a partneiship existed until the def2ndant took possession 
of the cattle and a partnership accounting was held between 
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the parties by the defendant paying $90,676.33 to the plaintiff 
on March 30, 1975 at which time the transaction was completed, 
and therefore defendant's claim for further accounting is 
denied. 
4. That on Count II of Defendant's Counterclaim, 
a partnership accounting was held between the parties by 
the allocation of profits to defendant in the sum of $4,600.00 
at which time the partnership transaction was completed, and 
defendant's claim for further accounting is denied. 
5. That on Count III of Defendant's Counterclaim 
a partnership accounting was held between the parties by the 
allocation of profits to defendant in the sum of $2,000.00, 
at which time the partnership transaction was completed, and 
therefore defendant's claim for further accounting is denied. 
6. That on Count IV of Defendant's Counterclaim 
a partnership accounting was held between the parties by the 
allocation of profits to the defendant in the sum of $2,500.00 
at which time the partnership transaction was completed, 
and therefore defendant's claim for further accounting is denied. 
7. That on Count V of Defendant's Counterclaim, 
the defendant Zane Christensen is entitled to a judgment 
against the plaintiff in the sum of $4,000.00 plus interest 
at the legal rate from January 1, 1971 for feed costs connected 
with the defendant's agreement to feed cattle for plaintiff 
during the fall of 1970 and the spring of 1971. 
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Dated this 7 day of June, 1977. 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS, WEST 
& SCHAERRER 
BY THE COURT 
(s) J. Duffy Palmer 
District Judge 
By __ ~~~~~~~-----------James R. Morgan 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1300 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
True and correct copies of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were mailed to: 
R. EARL DILLMAN 
10 Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
BRAND H. WALL 
Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
attorneys for Defendant, this _____ day of June, 1977. 
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